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Told Mrs. Nichols 'hat <u>BAZAAR</u> & <u>CASE OF THE ELUSIVE ASSASSIN</u> which they had, were mine, she said that <u>MURDER ON THE ORIENT EXPRESS</u> did very well at X'mas Also that <u>ACQUIRE</u> is selling well.
Told Mrs. Nichols 'hat <u>BAZAAR</u> & <u>CASE OF THE ELUSIVE ASSASSIN</u> which they had, were mine, she said that <u>MURDER ON THE ORIENT EXPRESS</u> did very well at X'mas Also that <u>ACQUIRE</u> is selling well.


Finished reading <u>THE COMPLEAT STRATEGYST</u>, which I borrowed from
Finished reading <u>THE COMPLEAT STRATEGYST</u>, which I borrowed from <br>
Clande. Regular analysis of simple games. It gives the rules of <u>MORRA</u> (the Italian finger game, and then gives a game theory strategy, the rules: ... 2 play. Each player extends some fingers and simultaneously guesses how many the enemy is extending. The number he may extend is 1,2, or 3, If only one player guesses the enemy digits successfully, the payoff to him is the total number of digits extended on the play. Otherwise the payoff is zero. Thus if Blue holds out 3 fingers and guesses I, while red holds out I and guesses 2 Blue will win because he's right he will win 4 units of pay off [ The proper strategy is to mix the following 3 strategies in proportion s:4:3 Extend I and guess 3. extend... 2 and guess 2 ; extend 3 and guess 1.]
Claude. Regular analysis of simple games. It gives the rules of <br>
<u>MORRA</u> (the Italian finger game), and then gives a game theory <br>
strategy, the rules : -  <br>
2 play. Each player extends some fingers and, simultaneously,  <br>
guesses how many the enemy is extending. The number <br>
he may extend is 1,2, or 3. If only one player guesses the <br>
enemy digits successfully, the payoff to him is the total number <br>
of digits extended on the play. Otherwise the payoff is zero. <br>
Thus if Blue holds out 3 fingers and guesses 1, while Red holds <br>
out 1 and guesses 2, Blue will win because he's right : he will win <br>
4 units of payoff. [The proper strategy is to mix the following <br>
3 strategies in proportion 5:4:3.  Extend I1and guess 3. extend <br>
2 and guess 2 ; extend 3 and guess 1.]